Europe’s gas benchmark jumped 6% in a single day. Analysts at Wood Mackenzie said the attacks “fundamentally reshape the global LNG outlook,” with disruption likely to last more than two months. This is not a tail risk. Europe, structurally dependent on imported LNG to replace Russian pipeline gas, is among the most exposed economies on the planet.

How We Got Here: From Covid to Ukraine to the Gulf

The roots of this instability stretch back to 2020, when the Covid-19 pandemic caused energy demand — and prices — to collapse. The rebound in 2021 pushed euro area wholesale electricity prices up by more than 400% within a single year. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 transformed disruption into a geopolitical shock, cutting off a supply that had accounted for 45% of EU gas imports and exposing structural dependence on Russian pipeline gas.

The consequences remain severe: in 2023, household gas prices were still almost twice pre-crisis levels, while European companies faced energy costs two to four times higher than competitors in the United States and China.

A System Still Dependent on the Outside World

Despite diversification efforts, the EU continues to import approximately 57% of the energy it consumes, including 94.9% of oil and around 90% of natural gas. This means prices are driven above all by external factors — geopolitical tensions, global markets, and LNG availability. When the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed, European gas prices surged around 20% in a single morning.

Europe’s vulnerability was compounded by low storage levels: 46 bcm in February 2026, down from 60 bcm in 2025 and 77 bcm in 2024. Forecasts now point to gas prices around 40% higher than expected for 2026, with levels exceeding €100/MWh and remaining elevated through 2027.

The Pattern Is Unmistakable

Recent crises reveal a recurring pattern: geopolitical shock, supply disruption, price spike, economic impact. What is new in 2026 is the simultaneity — the Strait of Hormuz disrupted, South Pars struck, and Ras Laffan damaged within weeks. As long as a significant share of European energy remains tied to imported fossil fuels — still around 57%, compared to 24% in China and 37% in India — external conflicts will continue to translate directly into domestic risk.

The Diversification Trap

Europe has diversified its gas supply. Russia’s share has fallen from 40% to 13%, replaced by Norway, the United States, and Algeria. On paper, the vulnerability has been addressed. In reality, diversification solved the supply problem but not the price problem. As long as fossil fuels dominate the system, prices are set on global markets that Europe does not control. When Ras Laffan burns — despite representing only about 3% of direct EU supply — prices still jump across the continent.

Europe has replaced dependence on a single supplier with dependence on a volatile global market. You cannot diversify your way out of that system — you can only build your way out of it.

Renewables: From Environmental Choice to Strategic Shield

In this context, renewable energy is no longer primarily an environmental argument. It is a security argument. In 2024, renewables accounted for 47.5% of EU electricity consumption, up from 15.9% in 2004. Unlike fossil fuels, they are local, predictable, and not exposed to global market volatility or geopolitical disruption. Each additional megawatt reduces exposure to exactly the kind of shocks Europe is facing today.

Conclusion: The Cost of Delay

Europe today faces a choice that is no longer theoretical. The world’s largest gas field is damaged. The world’s largest LNG terminal is shut. Brent crude is above $110. European gas prices are rising. The question is not whether to transition away from imported fossil fuels, but how long Europe can delay before doing so under pressure rather than strategy.

Every year of continued dependency is another year of exposure to a system that has repeatedly proven unreliable. The technology exists — the only question is how many more crises it will take.